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 1  Introduction 
In A Neurocomputational Perspective, Paul Churchland poses a fundamental and far-
reaching challenge to epistemology and philosophy of science. In their descriptions of our 
epistemic practices, both epistemologists and philosophers of science typically rely upon 
our ordinary categories for describing the operations of the mind—in particular, the 
notion of belief—commonly described as folk psychology. In contrast, Churchland’s 
eliminative materialism holds that folk psychology is a bad theory that will be replaced by 
the latest theories in cognitive science (Churchland, 1981). As well as requiring a radical 
shift in our conception of the nature of the mind, Churchland argues that eliminative 
materialism also undermines the theories of traditional epistemology and philosophy of 
science. Philosophers of science in particular must abandon their existing “sentential” 
framework for discussing scientists’ reasoning, knowledge and understanding. In its 
place, they must learn to adopt a radically new framework, in which the central notions 
are drawn from the technical vocabulary of neural network modelling (Churchland, 
1989). 
Churchland’s analysis focuses on the brain. By contrast, much recent work in cognitive 
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science stresses the importance of interaction of brain, body and world in carrying out 
cognitive tasks (e.g. Robbins and Aydede, 2008). Familiar examples include the way that 
we gesture when reasoning or reach for pen and paper when trying to solve a crossword 
puzzle. In light of this work, some authors have argued that cognition, and even mental 
states, sometimes extend beyond the brain and body into the world (Clark and Chalmers 
1998; Clark 2008). In previous work, I have argued that the extended mind thesis has 
important implications for the way that we understand scientists’ cognitive activity (Toon 
2014, 2015; for related approaches, see Bechtel, 1996; Nersessian, 2005; Giere, 2006). 
From this perspective, Churchland’s favoured successor to folk psychology looks too 
narrow in its focus on the brain alone. And yet his eliminativist challenge to philosophy of 
science must still be faced. Even if our best theory of cognition encompasses not only the 
brain, but also interaction between brain, body and environment, it might still turn out to 
stand at odds with the traditional, sentential framework of folk psychology. 
How should we respond to this challenge? Eliminativism is a hard road to follow. Folk 
psychology is intricately woven into the fabric of our language, and into the way that we 
talk about reasoning, knowledge and understanding in particular. Embracing 
eliminativism would therefore require a radical transformation in the way that we try to 
make sense of people and their epistemic activities. Moreover, given the difficulties faced 
by Churchland’s own approach, it remains far from clear what framework we ought to 
adopt in its place. This paper explores an alternative response to the threat of 
eliminativism. Mental fictionalism is the view, even though folk psychological states 
might not exist, it is useful to talk as if they do. According to the fictionalist, mental 
states, like beliefs and desires, are useful fictions (for discussion, see Wallace, 2007; 
Demeter, 2013a). In previous work, I have argued that a fictionalist approach captures the 
spirit of much of our ordinary talk about the mind (Toon, 2016). In this paper, I will argue 
that fictionalism also provides philosophers of science with a promising way to respond 
to Churchland. 
The discussion will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I will introduce eliminativism, 
focusing on Churchland’s account of the nature of understanding. In Section 3, I will 
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argue that Churchland’s account is too restrictive and that understanding is often an 
extended mental state. In Section 4 I will introduce mental fictionalism. Finally, in 
Section 5, I will show how fictionalism allows philosophers of science to respond to the 
threat of eliminativism. 
 2  Eliminativism and epistemology 
A key feature of folk psychology is the attribution of propositional attitudes. We say that 
Barbara believes that planes can fly, that George wants to go to the cinema, that Adam 
hopes that Derby County will win promotion this year, and so on. Such talk is also central 
to epistemology. To know that p is to have the belief that p, where that belief is true and 
suitably justified (or obtained in the right sort of way, etc.). Reasoning is taken to involve 
moving from one set of claims (e.g. that the body was found in the library, that the only 
person with a key was the butler) to another (e.g. that the butler did it). Classical 
approaches in cognitive science hope to find beliefs, desires and other propositional 
attitudes as language-like structures inside the head (e.g. Fodor, 1975). By contrast, 
Churchland argues that “the sentential kinematics of folk psychology is but a 
commonsense theory, and almost certainly a false theory” (1989, p. xvi). In fact, our best 
theories in cognitive science reveal that “the basic kinematics of cognitive creatures is a 
kinematic not of sentences but of high-dimensional activation vectors being transformed 
into other such vectors by passing through large arrays of synaptic connections” (1989, p. 
xvi). As a result, we ought to stop talking about beliefs, desires and other propositional 
attitudes and instead adopt the language of our best theories of mind and cognition. 
Like epistemologists in general, philosophers of science also tend to use the “sentential” 
framework of folk psychology when describing scientists’ reasoning, knowledge and 
understanding.
1
 As a result, they too face the challenge posed by eliminativism. Let us 
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 A noteworthy attempt to depart from the sentential framework is the semantic view of 
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focus on understanding in particular, since it is here that Churchland develops his 
approach in most detail. Churchland motives his account by pointing to the shortcomings 
of the deductive-nomological model of explanation (DN model) (Hempel, 1965). 
According to the DN model, we explain a phenomenon by showing how it may be 
deduced from some general law, together with relevant initial conditions. While the 
conceptual difficulties of the DN model are well known, Churchland argues that it is also 
psychologically unrealistic. People often possess explanatory understanding without 
being able to articulate the required laws or initial conditions. Moreover, they are often 
unable to perform the necessary deductions, at least not with the swiftness with which 
understanding often dawns. According to Churchland, such difficulties are not specific to 
the DN model. Instead, they stem from “the fundamental assumption that languagelike 
structures of some kind constitute the basic or most important form of representation in 
cognitive creatures, and the correlative assumption that cognition consists in the 
manipulation of those representations by means of structure-sensitive rules” (1989, p. 
154). 
As William Lycan (1996) has pointed out, Churchland’s criticism of the DN model is 
somewhat unfair, since most of its proponents did not aim to describe scientists’ cognitive 
processes (see also Bechtel, 1996). Such authors tended to focus on explanation, rather 
than understanding: while accounts like the DN model sought to spell out what makes a 
good scientific explanation, understanding was taken to be a subjective, psychological 
phenomenon of little interest to philosophers of science. Times have changed, however. 
Amongst both epistemologists and philosophers of science, there is now widespread 
agreement that understanding is an important cognitive state that we ought to try to 
analyse (Kvanvig, 2003; de Regt, et al., 2009). It is also commonly agreed that 
understanding goes beyond merely knowing the various facts and theoretical principles 
                                                                                                                                                  
theories (e.g. Suppe, 1974; Van Fraassen, 1980; Giere, 1988). For a critical discussion 
of the semantic view in relation to eliminativism, see Churchland (1989, pp. 157-158). 
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needed to explain some phenomenon. To possess understanding, it is said, someone must 
also “see” or “grasp” how the various principles and facts fit together. In this vein, Wayne 
Riggs (2003, p. 218) writes that: 
“[a]n important difference between merely believing a bunch of true 
statements within subject matter M, and having understanding of M, is that 
one somehow sees the way things fit together. There is a pattern discerned 
within all the individual bits of information or knowledge’’ 
Consider the question “why do planes fly?” On this view of understanding, someone who 
understands why planes fly can do more than simply recall Bernoulli’s principle, recite 
facts about air pressure, and so on; she also “grasps” or “sees” the connections between 
these things. For example, she must “grasp” how Bernoulli’s principle applies to the air 
flow around the wing, “see” how the difference in air speed will result in a difference in 
pressure, and so on. This conception of understanding differs from the DN model in a 
number of respects. In particular, it does not require that the relationship between the 
different propositions involved be deductive. And yet it remains resolutely “sentential” in 
its approach and so, if Churchland is correct, must ultimately be discarded. 
In place of the DN model, and other sentential accounts of understanding, Churchland 
proposes his own prototype-activation model (PA model). The key theoretical notions 
underpinning the PA model are drawn from artificial neural networks or connectionist 
models of the brain. Put simply, connectionist networks are collections of input-output 
devices called units. Each unit can be activated to various degrees and is connected to 
other units by “synaptic” connections with different weights. When the input units are 
activated, a pattern of activation spreads throughout the network, resulting in a particular 
output. The way that the network responds to a particular input is determined by the 
weights of the connections between its units. Once the network’s connection weights are 
adjusted correctly, it will learn to categorise input patterns into different groups. One of 
Churchland’s main examples is a network that learnt to categorise sonar echoes into two 
groups: those resulting from underwater mines from those resulting from rocks on the 
seabed. For each category that the network can distinguish, there will be a prototypical 
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response. In the rock-mine network, this is the pattern of response corresponding to a 
prototypical mine or prototypical rock. Responses to actual mines or rocks will tend to 
cluster around these prototypes (Churchland, 1989, pp. 200-206). 
According to Churchland, connectionism provides a “possible conception of knowledge 
or understanding that owes nothing to the sentential categories of current common sense” 
(1989, p. 177). For example, an individual’s theory of the world, Churchland argues, “is 
not a large collection or a long list of stored symbolic items. Rather, it is a specific point 
in that individual’s synaptic weight space. It is a configuration of connection weights, a 
configuration that partitions the system’s activation-vector space(s) into useful divisions 
and subdivisions relative to the inputs typically fed the system” (1989, p. 177). The 
connectionist framework is also central to Churchland’s PA model of understanding. 
According to the PA model, “understanding consists in the activation of a specific 
prototype vector in a well-trained network. It consists in the apprehension of the 
problematic case as an instance of a general type, a type for which the creature has a 
detailed and well-informed representation (1989, p. 210). For example, in the case of the 
rock-mine network, understanding might consist in the fact that, when presented with a 
sonar echo from a mine that it has not yet encountered, the network follows a pattern of 
activation close to that of the prototypical mine. 
Churchland argues that abandoning the sentential framework will transform our approach 
to a whole raft of issues in philosophy of science, including “the nature of theories, the 
theory-ladeness of perception, the nature of conceptual unification, the virtues of 
theoretical simplicity, the nature of paradigms, the kinematics of conceptual change, the 
character of abductive inference, and the nature of explanatory understanding” (1989, p. 
xv). And yet, as Churchland himself acknowledges, pursuing this new approach is far 
from straightforward. As we noted earlier, abandoning the categories of folk psychology 
would require a fundamental shift in the way that we talk about people and their 
behaviour, and their reasoning, knowledge and understanding in particular. For example, 
Churchland notes that, when it comes to saying what it is that makes one explanation 
better than another, “we must answer carefully, since we are denied the usual semantic 
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vocabulary of reference, truth, consistency, entailment, and so forth” (1989, p. 220). 
Instead, we must learn to answer such questions within a radically different framework of 
networks, connection weights and activation vectors. 
 3  Extended cognition 
Churchland’s account focuses on the brain. In response, Bill Bechtel (1996) has argued 
that this approach is too narrow. In fact, 
“Churchland is mistaken in localizing the focus of philosophy of science 
exclusively in activities occurring in the heads of scientists. While 
representations are central to scientific activity, the representations that 
matter are not exclusively mental representations. They are also external 
representations such as are found in sentences of natural language as well as 
in tables, figures, and diagrams.” (1996, p. 122; for similar criticism of 
Churchland, see Giere 2002) 
External representations are not merely vehicles for communication, Bechtel argues. 
Instead, they play a key role in scientists’ reasoning processes. For example, 
“constructing an explanation is an interactive activity involving both the cognitive agent 
and various external representational systems” (Bechtel 1996, p. 126). To illustrate this 
idea, Bechtel cites an influential discussion of multiplication by the San Diego 
connectionist group (Rumelhart, et al., 1986). Most of us aren’t able to multiply three 
digit numbers in our heads. If we’re given pen and paper, however, the task becomes 
much easier: we can write the numbers down one underneath the other and work step-by-
step through the procedure for long multiplication. In this way, we transform a complex 
task (e.g. multiplying 546 by 837) into a series of much simpler tasks (e.g. multiplying 3 
x 4, remembering to carry the 1, and so on). While connectionist models might explain 
what is happening in our brain when we do this, the overall task is accomplished by a 
larger system that includes external, material representations. 
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In recent years, a growing body of work in cognitive science has revealed that much of 
our cognitive activity has a similar character, involving productive cooperation between 
internal and external resources (e.g. Robbins and Aydede, 2008). In light of this work, 
some philosophers have endorsed the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) (e.g. Clark 
and Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008; for related ideas, see Menary, 2007; Rowlands, 1999; 
Wheeler, 2005; and Wilson, 2004). According to HEC, external devices can sometimes 
become part of our cognitive processes. On this view, the pen and paper we use in long 
multiplication is not simply a useful tool; it is part of the mechanism that realises our 
cognitive processes, just like the neurons in our brain. Proponents of the extended mind 
thesis go further and argue that it is not only cognitive processes that can be realised by 
external devices; even mental states, such as beliefs, can extend outside the head. Thus, 
Clark and Chalmers (1998) offer the well-known example of Otto, an Alzheimer’s patient 
who carries a notebook wherever he goes to record useful information. According to 
Clark and Chalmers, Otto’s notebook plays a similar role to normal biological memory. 
As a result, they argue, we ought to count the entries in the notebook as Otto’s 
(dispositional) beliefs. Only an unmotivated bias for skin and skull would lead us to deny 
this (for debate over the extended mind thesis, see Menary, 2010). 
Bechtel’s criticism focuses mainly on what we might call explanatory inquiry—that is, 
the reasoning process that scientists follow in order to construct a new explanation for 
some phenomenon (1996, pp. 131-135). At first glance, we might think that, even if 
explanatory inquiry involves external representations, still the outcome of that process—
that is, the state of understanding itself—remains inside the head. Elsewhere, I have 
argued that this would be a mistake. In fact, understanding is often an extended mental 
state (Toon, 2015). To see this, suppose that, rather than “why do planes fly?”, we 
consider a more difficult question, like “why do planes experience Dutch roll?” Dutch roll 
is an oscillatory motion that can affect planes when they fly through turbulence. It is a 
fairly complicated phenomenon: merely writing down the equations of motion required to 
explain it requires a page or two, and textbooks normally include a series of diagrams and 
graphs to show the sequence of steps in a typical Dutch roll cycle. Now suppose that 
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Barbara is an aeronautical engineer. When she is asked why planes experience Dutch 
Roll, Barbara is able to write down the relevant theoretical principles and facts about air 
pressure, plane’s wings, and so on. She can also show how these principles and facts 
combine to lead to Dutch roll. Without pen and paper, however, Barbara is unable to work 
through these steps. I suggest that this is a case of extended understanding. Barbara 
understands Dutch roll: she not only knows the relevant facts and theoretical principles; 
she also “sees” or “grasps” the connections between them. It is simply that these acts of 
“seeing” or “grasping” don’t happen entirely inside her head (for further discussion, see 
Toon, 2015). 
Of course, Churchland is well aware that scientists make use of pen and paper. And yet, 
he insists, the use of external representational devices should be kept distinct from 
understanding proper: 
The prototype activation model is focused first and foremost on what it is to 
have explanatory understanding of a problematic thing, event, or state of 
affairs. The linguistic expression, exchange, or production of understanding, 
should there be any, is an entirely secondary matter” (1989, p. 198). 
According to Churchland, an explanation—in the sense of a set of sentences written down 
on paper—may represent a scientists’ understanding of some phenomenon and it may be 
enough to cause that understanding in others (1996a, p. 258). The understanding itself, 
however, remains entirely internal. The notion of extended understanding suggests that 
this view of the role of external representations is mistaken. In Barbara’s case, external 
representations do not serve merely to represent her understanding or pass that 
understanding on to other people. Instead, the pen and paper is itself part of the material 
basis that realises Barbara’s understanding of the phenomenon. In criticising the DN 
model, Churchland objects that working through a DN explanation takes some time, 
whereas understanding often dawns upon us almost immediately. We see that the kitchen 
is filled with smoke and realise straightaway that the toast is burning (1989, p. 199). 
Barbara’s case serves to remind us that not all understanding is like this, however. In the 
case of more complex phenomena, such as that of Dutch roll, exercising our grasp of the 
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relevant facts may take more time and involve prolonged and highly skilled interaction 
with external, material devices. 
If scientists’ cognitive processes and mental states can extend into the environment, then 
Churchland’s own approach looks too narrow. What about traditional, sentential 
epistemology? In some respects, it might now seem to be on safer ground. For even if 
Churchland is right to say that the brain does not operate on language-like entities, such 
entities will often be found in scientists’ extended cognitive systems. After all, Barbara 
writes down the various facts and theoretical principles required to explain Dutch roll. In 
this sense, it might seem that the sentential story is vindicated (Bechtel, 1996; see also 
Clark, 1989). 
And yet not all cases of understanding will involve external, linguistic representations. In 
this vein, Churchland (1996b) argues that non-human animals and pre-linguistic children 
can possess understanding. For Churchland, this supports his non-linguistic, PA model. 
Rather than insisting upon a single, universal account of the nature of understanding, 
however, we might instead allow for a range of different cases. In some instances, 
understanding might depend upon external, linguistic representations, while in others it 
might not. And, of course, even where external representations are involved, they might 
not be linguistic (Bechtel 1996). Rather than writing down various facts and principles, 
for example, Barbara might instead resort to working with graphs and diagrams, 
sketching the plane from various angles and positions. Alternatively, she might need to 
pick up a plastic model of a plane, imagining it being buffeted by a crosswind and tilting 
its wings from side to side. Or she might gesture with her hands instead. Each of these 
cases might require a different account of the underlying dynamics of cognition and each 
might find itself at odds with a traditional, sentential story. 
So it appear that, although the notion of extended cognition might point to shortcomings 
in Churchland’s own approach, his eliminativist challenge must still be met. Can we 
continue to use the sentential framework of folk psychology and talk about scientists 
believing particular propositions, inferring from one claim to another and “seeing” 
connections between them? Or must we search for a radical new framework—or perhaps 
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frameworks—which can capture the complex interplay that takes place between 
scientists’ internal, pattern-matching abilities, bodily skills and external, material devices? 
In response to this challenge, I suggest that we turn to fictionalism. 
 4  Mental fictionalism 
According to the fictionalist, folk psychological states like beliefs and desires are useful 
fictions (Wallace, 2007; Demeter, 2013a). In earlier work, I have developed a version of 
this approach by drawing on Kendall Walton’s theory of fiction (Toon, 2016). The 
guiding idea behind this approach is that our ordinary talk about mental states can be 
understood along the same lines as acts of pretence within a game of make-believe. 
Suppose that some children are playing with a doll. In Walton’s terminology, the doll is a 
prop and the rules that govern the children’s game are called principles of generation 
(Walton, 1990). The props in a game, together with its principles of generation, require 
the children to imagine certain things. For example, if the doll is in its pushchair, then the 
children are to imagine that the baby is in its pushchair. In Walton’s terminology, this is 
fictional in the game. Children also participate in games in various ways. For example, 
they might push the doll along in the pushchair, thereby making it fictional that they are 
taking the baby for a walk. They also participate verbally. Significantly for our purposes, 
these acts of verbal participation can be used to make genuine assertions. Suppose George 
says “The baby’s in her pushchair”. When he says this, George isn’t really claiming that 
there is a baby in the pushchair; he is “only” pretending. And yet, by doing so, George 
indicates that pretending in this way is appropriate. As a result, George does make a 
genuine assertion: he claims that the state of the props is such that to pretend in the way 
that he does is, fictionally, to speak the truth. In other words, he claims that the doll is in 
the pushchair. 
Games with dolls are what Walton (1993) calls content oriented: the children’s interest is 
not with the doll per se, but with the content of the make-believe world it helps to create. 
In some cases, however, our interest lies in the props themselves; the role of make-believe 
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is to help us to understand the props. Walton (1993) argues that this prop oriented make-
believe may be found in cases of metaphor: 
“Where in Italy is the town of Crotone?, I ask. You explain that it is on the 
arch of the Italian boot. ‘See the thundercloud over there – the big angry 
face near the horizon,’ you say; ‘it is headed this way’. Plumbers and 
electricians distinguish between ‘male’ and ‘female’ plumbing and electrical 
connections. […] 
All of these cases are linked to make-believe. We think of Italy and the 
thundercloud as something like pictures. Italy (or a map of Italy) depicts a 
boot. The cloud is a prop which makes it fictional that there is an angry face. 
Male and female plumbing or electrical connections are understood to be, 
fictionally, male and female sexual organs. […] But our interest, in these 
instances, is not in the make-believe itself, and it is not for the sake of 
games of make-believe that we regard these things as props. […] 
Make-believe […] is useful in these cases […] for articulating, 
remembering, and communicating facts about the props – about the 
geography of Italy, or the identity of the storm cloud, or functional 
properties of plumbing or electrical fixtures […]. It is by thinking of Italy or 
the thundercloud or plumbing connections as potential if not actual props 
that I understand where Crotone is, which cloud is the one being talked 
about, or whether one pipe can be connected to another.” (Walton, 1993, pp. 
40-41) 
Suppose that Elaine says “Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot”. When she says this, 
Elaine is not claiming there really is a giant boot in the Mediterranean; she is involved in 
pretence. And yet, like George when he talks about the baby, Elaine also makes a genuine 
assertion: she claims that the state of the props is such that to pretend in the way that she 
does is, fictionally, to speak the truth. In other words, Elaine asserts that Crotone is in a 
particular spot on the southern coast of Italy. In this case, make-believe is not interesting 
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for its own sake; instead, it provides a vivid and memorable way of communicating a fact 
about the props in the game—that is, about the geography of Italy. 
I suggest that we understand ordinary talk about mental states along similar lines. The 
Italian boot provides a useful game for understanding the geography of Italy. In a similar 
manner, folk psychology provides a useful game for understanding people and their 
behaviour. In this game, we imagine that people have certain states inside their heads, 
such as beliefs and desires. We also imagine that these states are caused by certain 
experiences, interact in certain ways, and cause certain sorts of behaviour. We are no 
more committed to the existence of this inner machinery than we are to the existence of 
the Italian boot. And yet pretending that this machinery exists serves an important 
purpose, providing us with an enormously valuable means of explaining and predicting 
people’s behaviour. 
Although folk psychological talk involves pretence, it also allows us to make genuine 
assertions. Suppose that Elaine says “George wants to go to the cinema tonight”. 
According to the fictionalist, when she says this, Elaine is not claiming that there is a 
particular sort of causal state inside George’s head. Instead, she is invoking a familiar 
pretence within the game of folk psychology. By doing so, however, Elaine does make a 
genuine assertion about George: she claims that he is in some state S such that, fictionally, 
she speaks the truth. There are many different situations that would make Elaine’s 
pretence appropriate: George might be standing patiently in a queue outside the box 
office, eagerly buying his tickets online, loudly complaining that he has to work tonight 
instead, and so on. Invoking the game of folk psychology provides Elaine with a concise 
and extremely valuable—in fact, indispensable—means for picking out this disparate set 
of scenarios and thereby describing George and his behaviour. 
In earlier work, I have tried to demonstrate the attractions of this way of understanding 
folk psychology and its advantages over related approaches, such as behaviourism and 
instrumentalism (Toon, 2016). In what follows, I want to focus on how fictionalism can 
help us to respond to the eliminativist’s challenge to epistemology and philosophy of 
science. 
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 5  Epistemology as fiction 
The eliminativist claims that folk psychology is bad theory of mind and cognition. As a 
result, talk of beliefs, desires and other mental states should go the same way as talk about 
witches and phlogiston. While it might be difficult to accept, says the eliminativist, this 
harsh lesson applies to philosophers of science no less than it does to the folk. They too 
must stop talking about scientists believing certain claims, inferring from one proposition 
to the next, and so on. This “sentential” view of cognition must be jettisoned as a faulty 
picture of the reality of scientists’ cognitive lives. In its place, we must learn to adopt the 
radical new theories formulated by our best cognitive science. For Churchland, this means 
embracing the technical vocabulary of connectionism and learning to describe and assess 
scientists’ reasoning, knowledge and understanding in terms of networks, activation 
vectors and prototypes. As we have seen, more recent movements in cognitive science 
point in a different direction, seeking to capture complex interactions between our brains, 
bodies and external devices—some linguistic, others not. Taking this route, the final 
framework(s) that might replace folk psychology remain as yet unclear. 
Fictionalism suggests an alternative path. While the eliminativist claims that folk 
psychology is a bad theory, the fictionalist denies that the folk were trying to give a 
theory of mind and cognition in the first place. According to fictionalism, when the folk 
say that someone has a particular belief, they are not making a claim about their inner 
machinery. Instead, talk about mental states is a useful fiction. As a result, the legitimacy 
of folk psychology does not depend upon cognitive science discovering beliefs and 
desires inside the head. Even if such states do not exist, says the fictionalist, it is useful to 
talk as if they do. This suggests a way for philosophers of science to respond to 
Churchland’s challenge. Rather than treating the traditional, sentential framework as a 
theory of the nature of cognition, we ought instead to regard it as a useful metaphor for 
describing scientists’ reasoning, knowledge and understanding. Crucially, I suggest, this 
metaphor serves to encompass not only what happens inside the scientists’ head, but also 
their interactions with external, material devices (for a similar position, see Dennett, 
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1996). 
To see how this might work, let us return to the case of understanding. As we have seen, 
both epistemologists and philosophers of science typically characterise understanding in 
sentential terms. To understand a phenomenon, it is said, someone must believe a set of 
propositions about it and “see” or “grasp” the connections between them. Churchland 
urges us to reject this view as a mistaken attempt to capture the underlying dynamics of 
cognition. The fictionalist suggests that we resist this interpretation of folk discourse. 
When we attribute understanding to someone, we are not claiming that they have a set of 
language-like structures inside their head. Instead, we are invoking the game of folk 
psychology; we are availing ourselves of a familiar and invaluable form of pretence. As a 
result, the epistemologists’ characterisation of understanding in sentential terms need not 
be given up if it turns out that the brain does not operate on language-like structures. 
When we invoke our pretence, we do make a genuine assertion: we claim that the person 
to whom we are attributing understanding is in some state S such that, fictionally, we 
speak the truth. Importantly, this state can encompass factors that extend beyond the 
person’s brain and body. As we saw in Section 3, understanding can take any number of 
different forms and will often involve interaction with external devices: Barbara’s 
understanding of Dutch roll might depend upon her writing down equations with pen and 
paper, drawing diagrams, working with models, or even gesturing. When we say that 
Barbara understands Dutch roll, we are saying that she is in any one of these states—the 
states such that it is appropriate to pretend as we do. In some of these cases, there will be 
language-like structures involved, so that our sentential characterisation of understanding 
might come close to the truth. In other cases, the underlying dynamics of cognition might 
stand at odds with the sentential framework. Despite this, each of these different scenarios 
counts as a case in which our pretence is appropriate. 
Why the detour via make-believe? Why talk about things that don’t exist? One reason is 
that metaphor allows us to express things that we cannot express in a straightforward, 
literal description. Recall the Italian boot. In this case, we can offer a literal paraphrase 
for our assertion about Crotone: we are claiming that it lies on the southern coast of Italy 
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between Capo Colonna and Taranto. In other cases, however, a literal paraphrase might 
not be available. Thus, Stephen Yablo argues that some metaphors are representationally 
essential (1998, p. 250). In such cases, 
“the language might have no more to offer in the way of a unifying principle 
for the worlds in a given content than that they are the ones making the 
relevant sentence fictional. It seems at least an open question, for example, 
whether clouds we call angry are the ones that are literally F, for any F other 
than ‘such that it would be natural and proper to regard them as angry if one 
were going to attribute emotions to clouds’”. (Yablo, 1998, p. 250) 
Like the metaphor of angry clouds, our folk psychological metaphors might also be 
representationally essential (Toon, 2016). In some cases, understanding might involve 
manipulating external, linguistic structures. In others, it might involve diagrams, graphs 
or models. In still other cases, it might be entirely internal. Despite the hopes of 
Churchland and others to offer a single, overarching theory of understanding, it might 
turn out that there is little in common between these various different cases—apart from 
that each counts as a case in which it is appropriate to attribute understanding within the 
game of folk psychology. 
Metaphors also bring further benefits. They introduce “framing effects” in which we are 
asked to “see” our primary subject (e.g. Italy, clouds) in terms of another, secondary 
subject (e.g. a boot, emotions) (Moran, 1989; Beardsley, 1962). This can be extremely 
fruitful, leading us to a host of further insights and prompting a range of further questions 
about the primary subject matter. By asking us to see people as if they had certain inner 
states interacting in various ways, folk psychology offers an enormously powerful 
framing effect for explaining and predicting their behaviour (Toon, 2016; see also 
Demeter, 2013b). For example, if Barbara understands Dutch roll, we can infer that she 
has various beliefs about it. If we also assume that Barbara possesses various other mental 
states (e.g. the desire to avoid feeling sick), then we will also predict that she will act in 
certain ways (e.g. designing her new aircraft in ways that minimise Dutch roll). We can 
also ask whether, in order to possess understanding, the propositions that Barbara believes 
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must be true (Elgin, 2009) or ask how exactly how “seeing” or “grasping” a set of 
propositions differs from merely knowing them (Grimm, 2006). 
The key advantage of fictionalism over eliminativism, then, is that it allows us to retain 
our ordinary categories for making sense of scientists’ epistemic activities. Such talk 
serves its own distinctive purposes and need not await vindication from our final science 
of the mind. Of course, the fictionalist can still share the eliminativists’ keen interest in 
the latest developments in cognitive science. If we want to understand exactly how it is 
that scientists recognise certain patterns, for example, or explore the way in which they 
interact with graphs or diagrams, the sentential framework may have little to tell us. Here 
we will need to consult our latest theories in these domains. And yet, the fictionalist 
insists, the sentential framework will continue to play its role, allowing us to draw 
together otherwise disparate forms of behaviour and explore their interconnections. 
Indeed, folk psychology might retain this role, even once our final cognitive science is in 
hand. 
Conclusion 
Eliminativism presents an important challenge to epistemologists and philosophers of 
science. Might the language that we use to describe reason, knowledge and understanding 
turn out to be fundamentally misguided? If so, must we find a radically new framework 
for describing our epistemic activities? Fictionalism offers a promising alternative. 
According to the fictionalist, our traditional, sentential framework plays a vital role in 
making sense of our epistemic practices, even if it fails to describe our inner machinery—
even if, in fact, it was never intended to do that. For Churchland, the sentential framework 
is a bad theory. For the fictionalist, it is not a theory, but a metaphor—and an invaluable 
one. 
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